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SEARCH AND SEIZURE - INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST -
PERMISSIBLE SCOPE
Chimel v. California,
395 U.s. 752 (1969).
No one can doubt the radical impact which the Warren Court
has had upon local law enforcement procedures.1 Search and sei-
zure incident to a valid arrest, an area of the law already racked
with inconsistent judicial guidelines,2 has been one of the areas
most drastically affected.3 It was perhaps only proper then that on
the day that President Nixon personally went to the Supreme Court
to accept Chief Justice Warren's formal resignation,4 the Court
handed down its decision in Chimel v. California,5 which further
limited accepted police methods of conducting a search incident to
a valid arrest. Only history will reveal the plausibility of the guide-
lines laid down by the Warren Court on its final day; but for those
who must utilize this decision as a guideline in their daily work, the
effect will be both immediate and profound.'
Petitioner Chimel was arrested in the living room of his home
1See Pringle & Garfield, The Expanding Power of Police to Search and Seize:
Effect of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Investigation, 40 ROCKY
MT. L. REv. 491 (1968). In a pre-Chimel article, the authors point out that most of
the recent controversial decisions handed down by the Court have affected the rights of
the accused after he is taken into custody, and that these same decisions have had very
little effect on the criminal investigation procedures utilized before the suspect has
been taken into custody.
2 This lack of consistency has been referred to by members of the Court on several
occasions. In delivering the majority opinion in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377 (1968), Mr. Justice Harlan candidly admitted that "the law of search and seizure is
in a state of flux." Id. at 393. See also Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 235 (1960);
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 67, 86 (1950) (Black & Frankfurter, JJ., re-
spectively, dissenting).
3 Following a recent, in-depth survey of criminal activity in the United States, a
Presidential Commission was moved to observe that during the last 30 years, standard
police procedures offensive to individual privacy have been increasingly restricted by
court rulings: "Personal and property searches and the seizure of the evidence they
yield ... have been more and more rigorously measured by the courts against the con-
stitutional standards of due process ... probable cause . .. [and] the privilege against
self incrimination." U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 93 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
4395 U.S. (pt. 3) at I-VII (1969).
5 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
6 The President's Commission was aware of the disruptive effect which Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and other recent decisions might have on heretofore
standard police practices and noted that "the need for legislative and administrative
policies to guide police through the changing world of permissible activity is pressing."
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 94.
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by local police officers pursuant to what was ostensibly a valid ar-
rest warrant. Over the objections of the petitioner, and without a
search warrant, the police undertook a systematic search of the en-
tire house on the ground that the search was incident to a valid ar-
rest.' At petitioner's trial, several items seized during this search
were admitted into evidence and he was found guilty.8
In affirming Chimel's conviction, both the district court of ap-
peals' and the California Supreme Court' ° accepted petitioner's con-
tention that the arrest warrant was invalid." Nevertheless, reason-
ing that the arresting officers, acting in good faith and with personal
knowledge of the circumstances, had probable cause,'" they held that
the search was lawful.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' 3 and reversed petitioner's
conviction, holding that the search of Chimel's home without a
search warrant was unreasonable under the fourth and 14th amend-
ments. 4 In reaching this conclusion, the Court explicitly overruled
7 See note 11 infra.
8 395 U.S. at 754.
0 People v. Chimel, 61 Cal. Rptr. 714 (Ct. App. 1967).
10People v. Chimel, 68 Cal. 2d 436, 439 P.2d 333, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1968).
11 The invalid affidavit is reproduced in 61 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16 n.1. Both courts
agreed that the arrest warrant was invalid because the complaint on which it was based
merely stated conclusions, rather than underlying facts and circumstances as required
by the decisions in Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958), and Aguilar v.
Texas, 372 U.S. 108 (1964). It should also be noted that the California appellate
courts came to their respective conclusions long before the Supreme Court's recent de-
cision in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), which further delineated the
requirements for an adequate showing of probable cause.
12 61 Cal. Rptr. at 715; 68 Cal. 2d at 442 & n.4, 439 P.2d at 337 & n.4, 67 Cal.
Rptr. at 13 & n.4 (specifying the reasons why probable cause existed in this case).
Probable cause, when cited as the basis for an arrest, implies a quantum of evidence
necessary to substantiate independent police action. Mr. Justice Harlan recently stated:
"Probable cause to arrest means evidence that would warrant a prudent or reasonable
man... in believing that a particular person has committed or is committing a crime."
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 75 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Mc-
Cray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304 (1967); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
Probable cause, when considered in connection with search warrants, takes on a
slightly different emphasis. In this latter context, the quantum of evidence required
to sustain a valid search warrant is perhaps greater than that required to validate inter-
vention by the police in a chance street encounter. See Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410, 415 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964).
The inference seems to be that the determination of probable cause made by a
neutral magistrate in detached surroundings will be judged by a more stringent criterion
than the same determination made by a police officer in the fast-moving world of ac-
tive law enforcement. See generally Note, Scope Limitations for Searches Incident to
Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433, 436 n.4 (1969).
'3 393 U.S. 958 (1968).
14 The fourth amendment provides:
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its previous decisions in Harris v. United States'" and United States
v. Rabinowitz,6 and clearly rejected California's contention that the
permissible scope of a search incident to a valid arrest may extend
to any area considered to be under the control of the person arrested,
a principle present in both Harris and Rabinowitz.
The problem of adequately defining the permissible scope of
search incident to a valid arrest has plagued the Court for many
years. In fact, only through a brief historical sketch of the ebb and
flow of the development of the permissible scope doctrine can one
savor the full significance of Chimel. The limited right of search
and seizure is predicated on, and guarded by, the warrant provi-
sions of the fourth amendment.17 Under certain circumstances, how-
ever, the Court has nonetheless seen fit to grant certain exceptions
to the fourth amendment's requirement that searches and seizures
be made only pursuant to the warrant requirement. The right of
the police to search for and seize certain items'" incident to a lawful
arrest is one of the acknowledged exceptions. 9 Given this impor-
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court held that admission of
evidence gained in violation of the fourth amendment was violative of the fifth amend-
ment due process clause and, therefore, must be excluded from a federal criminal pro-
secution. Not until 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), did the Court find
that the exclusionary rule of Weeks was also applicable through the 14th amendment to
criminal prosecutions in state courts. In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), the
Court ruled that the standards of reasonableness required under the fourth amendment
do not vary when applied to the states via the 14th.
15331 U.S. 145 (1947). The Court had affirmed Harris' conviction which re-
sulted from evidence gained in a systematic search of his entire apartment, conducted
without a search warrant, and having nothing to do with the charge on which peti-
tioner had originally been arrested. Id. at 155.
16 339 U.S. 56 (1950), holding, in part, that a warrantless search of Rabinowitz's
entire one-room office was not necessarily invalid if the method used to accomplish
the search was reasonable in view of the particular circumstances surrounding the situa-
tion. Id. at 65-66.
17 For the full text of the fourth amendment, see note 14 supra.
18The language of the majority opinion indicates that such items may include
weapons which the suspect might use to resist arrest or to effect an escape, and evidence
of a crime which may be concealed or destroyed. 395 U.S. at 768. These two general
categories do not appear to be exclusive. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
66-67 (1968) (seizure of tools used to commit a crime held valid); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (seizure of contraband narcotics also held valid).
19 In addition to search and seizure incident to a valid arrest, the Court has grafted
certain other exceptions onto the fourth amendment. See Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (hot pursuit); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59-62
(1967) (automobile); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628-29 (1946) (consent);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156 (1925) (contraband). See also Stoner
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tant exception, the problem has remained to adequately define the
reasonable perimeter of the search.
Part of the difficulty stems from the Court's use of questionable
legal craftsmanship in the early part of this century.20 Beginning
with Weeks v. United States,21 and culminating with its decision in
Marron v. United States,2 2 the Court, by implication, expanded the
permissible bounds of the search and seizure to include not only
the arrestee's person but also the immediate premises under his
control.23 Although the rapid expansion of permissible scope, from
the person in Weeks to the premises in Maron, was halted for a
time,24 it was again continued in Harris v. United States.25  In Har-
v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176-77 (1948); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-56 (1948).
Besides the exceptions created by case law, there have been certain exceptions created
by statute. See, e.g., Comment, Border Searches - A Prostitution of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 10 ARIZ. L REV. 457, 458 n.6 (1968).20 See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68-86 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). After criticizing the former thinking of the Court starting with Weeks
and extending through Harris, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated: "They merely prove
how a hint becomes a suggestion, is loosely turned into dictum and is finally elevated
to a decision." Id. at 75.
21232 U.S. 383 (1914). By way of dicta, the Court recognized that a federal
agent could search both the person of a lawfully arrested suspect and the area within
his control. Id. at 392.
22 275 U.S. 192 (1927). The Court held that the right to seize articles not specif-
ically mentioned in the search warrant, but which were nevertheless used to maintain
a nuisance, extended to all parts of the premises on which the illegal activity was being
conducted. Id. at 198-99.
23The expansion process was given momentum by two further cases which came
after Weeks and before Mfarron. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the
Court condoned the warrantless search of a car, and the seizure of contraband alcohol
therefrom on the grounds that federal agents had probable cause to make the arrest,
and that it would be impractical to require a warrant where the subject of the search
could quickly move out of reach. Id. at 149-53. In Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20 (1925), the scope of search was extended, still by way of dicta, to include the
place in which a suspect was arrested, including his home. Although petitioner's con-
viction was reversed, the Court stated:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons law-
fully arrested while committing a crime and to search the plce where the ar-
rest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its
fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and
other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted. Id. at
30 (emphasis added).
The Court added: "While the question has never been directly decided by this court, it
has always been assumed that one's house cannot lawfully be searched without a search
warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein." Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
24See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 334 (1931), where the
Court held that a general exploratory search of the premises on which petitioner was
arrested, conducted without a warrant, was unreasonable because no crime was being
committed in the presence of the arresting officers. Id. at 357. See also United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1932).
25 331 U.S. 145 (1947). See notes 15-16 supra & accompanying text.
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ris, the Court concluded that, under appropriate circumstances, a
warrantless search incident to a valid arrest "may extend beyond
the person of the one arrested to include the premises under his im-
mediate control. 26  The permissiveness of the scope granted in
Harris was momentarily checked,2 7 and then completely reinstated
2 years later in United States v. Rabinowitz."
It thus becomes apparent that the permissible scope of search
incident to a valid arrest, as defined by the Supreme Court, has been
subject to guidelines which at best vary, and which at worst change
abruptly.29 Nevertheless, the accepted doctrine remained confined
to a search of the suspect and the premises under his immediate
control 0 until the present decision in Chimel where the Court held
26 331 U.S. at 150-51. The "appropriate circumstances" focused on by the Court
in Harris were that the items specifically being sought (cancelled checks) were of such
a nature that they might easily be either destroyed or concealed in a remote corner of
the arrestee's four-room apartment. It is interesting to note that the State in Chimel
tried to justify its warrantless search of petitioner's entire home on substantially the
same grounds. The items being sought in the latter case were small coins which the
police felt could be easily secreted in any remote corner of the premises. See Brief for
Respondent at 33, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
2 7 See Trnpiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), where the Court expressed
a more restrictive view of search and seizure by holding that certain contraband items,
seized by federal agents without a search warrant at the site of an illicit distillery, be
excluded from evidence. The Court reasoned that, absent exigent circumstances, it
was unlawful to seize such items when there was ample time and opportunity to secure
a search warrant. Id. at 705.
28 339 U.S. 56 (1950). See note 16 supra. The Court once again reverted to a
more lenient view of the permissible scope of a search incident to a valid arrest by
holding that it was not unreasonable for the arresting officers to search the arrestee's
entire one-room office following a valid arrest therein where the "premises were under
the control of the person arrested and where the crime was being committed." Id.
at 61.
The Court relied on the rationale of Marron and Harris, that where a crime is
being committed in the presence of the arresting officers and where a valid arrest has
taken place, the agents have a license to search the premises of the arrested party with-
out a search warrant. Id. at 61-63. At the same time, the Court distinguished Go-
Bart and Lefkowitz as being general exploratory searches in situations where no crime
was being committed in the presence of the arresting officers. Id. at 62-63.
In addition, the Court shifted the emphasis of reasonableness from the Trupiano
standard of the practicality of securing a search warrant to what the Court felt was the
more relevant standard of considering the method used to conduct the search viewed
in the context of the particular circumstances of the case. Id. at 64-66.
29 The problem presented by constantly fluctuating guidelines was succinctly stated
by Mr. Justice Black: "In my judgment it would be a wiser judicial policy to adhere to
the Trupiano rule of evidence, at least long enough to see how it works." Id. at 67
(Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
3oSee, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42 (1963), where the Court reasoned
that to prevent evidence from possibly being destroyed, an extensive search of a sus-
pected narcotics user's home without a warrant was lawful as being within the bounds
of Harris. Accord, Abel v. United States, 382 U.S. 217, 235-37 (1960). Even though
the Harris-Rabinowitz standard remained intact until Chimel, it was generally criticized
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that the warrantless search of a suspect's entire home was unreason-
able.31
Although the holding in Chimel represents a departure from
the permissive standards of search and seizure enunciated in Har-
ris and Rabinowitz, it is nevertheless consistent with the rationale
underlying recent decisions emanating from the closely related
areas of stop-and-frisk and arrest following hot pursuit. Evidently
mindful of the increasing rate of crime, the Court has redefined
the fourth amendment command of reasonableness as it applies to
the chance street encounter between the police and a suspect.
In the area of hot pursuit, the Court has adopted the policy
that the arresting officer may take reasonable precautions to pro-
tect himself and to insure that evidence is neither concealed nor
destroyed. In Warden v. Hayden,32 the Court reasoned that while
a search may lawfully extend to the entire premises on which the
suspect is arrested following hot pursuit, its scope should be tem-
pered by the immediate necessities of the situation.33 This doctrine
was further crystallized in Peters v. New York, 4 where the Court
held that it was reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person of a suspect for weapons or items evidencing criminal ac-
tivity when that suspect was apprehended following a short chase.35
Keeping pace with its decisions in stop-and-frisk, the Court
diligently moved to clarify some of the other ambiguities enshroud-
ing the concept of reasonableness relevant to search and seizure.
by the commentators. See generally Way, Increasing Scope of Search Incidental to
Arrest, 1959 WAsH. U.L.Q. 261. See also Note, supra note 12.
31395 U.S. at 768. The Framers did the Court no favor by declaring that the
fourth amendment prohibited only "unreasonable" searches, fox by couching the stan-
dard in negative terms, they made it difficult for the Court to give the term a positive,
workable definition. Basically, reasonableness goes to the method and intensity of a
search considered in view of facts and circumstances particular to that case. See Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1967); Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29
(1967); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); United States v. Rabin-
owitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 162 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also note 51 infra & ac-
companying text.
32 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
33 "The permissible scope of the search must ... be as broad as may reasonably be
necessary" to accomplish the immediate task. Id. at 299.
In a related context, it is important to note that the Hayden Court rejected the
"mere evidence" rule which for years had dictated that evidentiary matters such as per-
sonal papers could not be seized either under the authority of a search warrant or as
incident to a valid arrest, as opposed to items, such as fruits of a crime, which could
validly be seized under either circumstance. Id. at 295-96, 300-02.
34 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (companion case of Sibron v. New York).
35 Id. at 67.
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Affirming petitioner's conviction in Terry v. Ohio,3 6 the Court
reasoned that a "patdown" of the suspect's outer garments as a self-
protective measure was reasonable, 7 and thus it did not violate the
petitioner's rights under the fourth amendment.3 Such a search,
however, "must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances
which rendered its initiation permissible."39  The decision in Sibron
v. New York40 not only provides a significant contrast to Terry,
but also gives further insight into the evolving strict interpretation
of reasonableness. In reversing petitioner's conviction, the Court
cited the fact that the arresting officer had thrust his hands inside
the suspect's coat while searching for contraband narcotics, and
held that such an intrusion was unreasonable in light of the circum-
stances known to the officer at the time of the search.41 The im-
port of these decisions is that a search which is initiated upon prob-
able cause and which is restricted within reasonable limits to those
items which justified its inception, will not later be judged to be
violative of the arrestee's rights under the fourth amendment.
Immediately prior to Chimel, then, there were two operative
trends afoot in the area of search and seizure. On the one hand,
there was the older Harris-Rabinowitz standard which generally
permitted a warrantless search of the entire premises incident to a
valid arrest. On the other hand, there were the more recent deci-
sions emanating from the related fields of stop-and-frisk and hot
pursuit which limited the scope of a search to that area in which
the items which justified its inception might be found. The two
trends converged in Chimel, and the result was a new definition
of reasonableness for the fourth amendment.
A brief review of the facts will indicate that Chimel's case lent
86 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3 7 The arresting officer's cautious approach was not unmerited. Commission ob-
servers of police streetwork in high-crime neighborhoods of some large cities re-
ported that one out of every five persons frisked was found to be carrying either a
knife or a gun. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 94-95. Moreover, the
FBI reported that "in 1968, the trend established in prior years continued in that more
law enforcement officers met death by criminal action when attempting arrests than
from any other cause," and handguns accounted for nearly 75 percent of the deaths.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS - 1968, at 45-46
(1969).
38 392 U.S. at 8.
39 Id. at 19. See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
concurring).
40 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
41 Id. at 65. The relevant circumstances indicated that the arresting officer lacked
any justification for believing that the petitioner was armed or dangerous, and, thus,
thrusting his hand into the suspect's pocket was considered unreasonable.
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itself to a reevaluation of the concept of reasonableness by the Court.
Petitioner had been the primary suspect in two thefts of valuable
coins. Local police obtained a warrant for his arrest, but failed to
obtain a search warrant for his home.4 2  Following petitioner's ar-
rest in his living room, the arresting officers systematically searched
the entire premises. Their search was concentrated on those areas
in which stolen coins might be most readily concealed.43 Several
coins so found were introduced into evidence at petitioner's trial on
two charges of burglary.44 In reversing petitioner's conviction,
the Court elected not to consider the validity of the arrest, but opted
instead to determine whether there had been constitutional justifi;-
cation for the warrantless search of Chimel's entire home as mci-
dent to a valid arrest.4 5
The search for constitutional justification must focus upon an
historical interpretation of the Constitution. Indeed, through all its
other inconsistencies in dealing with the fourth amendment, the
Court has consistently emphasized the historical circumstances sur-
rounding the adoption of that amendment." In this context, the
fourth amendment is viewed as a barrier47 which the Framers placed
4 2 The arrest warrant was subsequently found to be invalid. See note 11 supra.
The State tried to justify its failure to obtain a search warrant on purely administrative
grounds. Moreover, the State contended that this particular arrest had taken place in
the petitioners home on the rather tenuous ground that the officers desired to avoid
causing the petitioner the embarrassment of being arrested at his place of work. See
Brief for Respondent at 34, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
43 The similarities with Harris are striking. In that case, petitioner was convicted
on the basis of evidence seized without a warrant and in the course of a lengthy and
systematic search of a multi-room dwelling. Further, in Harris the Court rationalized
that by secreting illegal draft cards, the petitioner was, in effect, committing a crime in
the presence of the officers, and that the illegal items could be seized on that ground
alone. 331 U.S. at 155. A similar argument could be made in Chimel to the effect that
by secreting stolen property, the petitioner was also committing a crime in the presence
of the arresting officers.
44 395 U.S. at 754.
451d. at 755.
46 -'he fourth amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted..... Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). See also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195-97
(1927).
The dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in both Harris and Rabinowitz
were based, in part, on the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the fourth amend-
ment. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 80-83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157-60 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). The rationale of these early dissents appears to have been adopted by the
present decision in Chimel.
4 7 
"We cannot sustain this warrant without diluting important safeguards [which]
assure that the judgment of a disinterested judicial officer will impose itself between
the police and the citizenry." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969).
See also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
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between the private citizen and the police in an attempt to protect
the integrity of the former from the zeal of the latter.4, The Court
found evidence for this view manifested in the fourth amend-
ment requirement that a lawful search may take place only under
certain guarded conditions and the fact that the warrant requirement
may be waived in only a limited number of special situations.49
The reasonable limits imposed on a warrantless search by Chimel
are an accurate reflection of the probable cause criterion which is
the fourth amendment prerequisite to the issuance of a search
warrant.80 Moreover, when determining the reasonableness of a
search - either with or without a warrant - the Court has evalu-
ated the method of a search in terms of its intensity, duration, and
scope.5 Resultantly, the guidelines laid down by Chimel, especially
when considered in the light of the hot pursuit and stop-and-frisk
cases, come as close as possible to insuring the protection of the ar-
restee's fourth amendment rights when the arresting officer is oper-
ating without a warrant.
Indeed, viewing the fourth amendment in both its historical and
modern perspective, the Court in Chimel could have reached no
other conclusion. Exceptional circumstances present in other
fourth amendment cases,"' allowing the search warrant requirement
to be dispensed with, were simply not present in Chimel. The
petitioner did not consent to the search of his home. He was not
fleeing or evidencing any intent to take flight. The place to be
searched was a permanent residence and not a movable vehicle.
The evidence being sought, though capable of being concealed, could
not be readily destroyed. Finally, the officers investigating peti-
tioner's activities had adequate time to prepare a valid search war-
48 Inherent in many of the Court's decisions is an underlying fear of unchecked
police action. "Power is a heady thing, and history shows that the police acting on
their own cannot be trusted." McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
See also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
This same fear of unchecked police action pervaded the Court's thinking in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and
resulted from what the Court felt was the unduly coercive atmosphere of the station
house.
4 9 See note 19 supra.
5OSee note 12 supra.
51 "A search which is reasonable at its inception, may violate the fourth amendment
by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1968).
See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Kreman v. United States,
353 U.S. 346 (1957); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
52 See note 19 supra.
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rant had they been so disposed.53  Absent any circumstances, then,
that might have otherwise justified a warrantless search of the
petitioner's entire home, it seems dear that the Court stood on firm
ground in holding that it was unreasonable for the search to extend
beyond the petitioner's person, or anything within his physical reach.
The real value of the decision seems to be that the Court, begin-
ning with its recent rulings in the related fields of stop-and-frisk
and arrest following hot pursuit, and continuing now in Chimel,
has beguni to formulate meaningful answers to traditionally per-
plex4ig problems. Workable guidelines are now being established
for those members of the community (legal and non-legal) who
are directly affected. These guidelines may readily be translated
into concrete language that law enforcement agencies can assimilate
and apply in discharging their duty. That the Court was able to
structure such definitive guidelines is largely attributable to the fact
that, unlike previous decisions, in Chimel the Court articulated its
decision in positive terms - specifying the limits within which the
arresting officer may reasonably search, rather than in negative
terms of where the officer may not search.
Nor does Chimel unduly hamper the efficient execution of a
valid arrest. The Court has merely drawn a protective zone around
the person of the arrestee, beyond which the arresting officers may
not search without a search warrant.54 To seize evidence outside
this protective zone, law enforcement officers must first secure a
search warrant to insure that evidence so obtained is "untainted"
and admissible in a judicial proceeding.
Presumably, the Supreme Court feels that the evidence necessary
to support the issuance of an arrest warrant is insufficient to justify
5 3 On this point, the State argued that it would be overly burdensome to require
the police to prepare an adequate affidavit describing in particular the several thousand
coins which they felt were secreted in the petitioner's home. See Brief for Respondent at
37, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
5 4 The "protective zone" spoken of here is not dissimilar in substance to the zone
of privacy concept recognized by the Court in previous fourth amendment cases. See,
e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
27 (1949); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1888). See also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965), which was based on a zone of privacy con-
cept emanating from not just one, but several constitutional guarantees.
Although the Constitution recognizes no right of privacy per se, the Court has seen
fit to engraft this right onto the fourth amendment. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), the Court recognized that the fourth amendment creates a "right of privacy, no
less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people."
Id. at 656. The right of privacy under the fourth amendment was extended in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which held that the petitioner could justifiably ex-
pect privacy when speaking from a public telephone booth, and that the government
agents violated that privacy when they eavesdropped on his conversation.
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an invasion of one's right to privacy by a warrantless search. Al-
though this result may be criticized because it places an obstacle in
the path of law enforcement agencies, the decision is consistent with
the Court's view that the protection of the fourth amendment
"reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty
of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted un-
der our federal system with the enforcement of the laws."55  The
effect of the decision is to prohibit law enforcement agencies from
using an arrest in the living room to serve as a license for the war-
rantless search of the arrestee's entire home and a general rummag-
ing of his personal effects. 56
It is suggested that the new guidelines established by Chimel for
the permissible scope of search and seizure incident to a valid arrest
are more plausible and realistic than their predecessors. Several
years ago, Mr. Justice Frankfurter questioned where the rational
line of limitation could be drawn if a search was permitted to extend
beyond the person of the arrestee.57  For the interim, at least, this
plaintive query has been answered - it must be drawn at the reach
of the arrestee.
THOMAS E. AFRICA
55 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
56 The Court in Chimel apparently equates the warrantless search of Chimel's en-
tire home with the offensively arbitrary searches which took place in England and the
Colonies during the 18th century under a general writ. Such an analysis is not unique
to Chime). In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967), the Court stated:
We have examined on many occasions the history and purposes of the
(fourth] amendment. It was a reaction to the evils of the use of the gen-
eral warrant in England and the wxits of assistance in the Colonies, and was
intended to protect against invasions of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life from searches under indiscriminate, general authority.
See also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195-96 (1927).
57 See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 79, (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting). See also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 197 (1947) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
